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4.1  Introduction 
Mexico’s announcement, in August of 1982, that it could no longer 
meet its international  financial obligations took most of the world by 
surprise, sending shivers down the spines of bankers, politicians, and 
international bureaucrats. That fateful Friday the 13th of August 1982 
marked the beginning of the worst international financial crisis since 
the Great Depression. What initially was thought to be an isolated case 
of temporary illiquidity soon spread to most of the developing world, 
placing  the  stability  of  the international  financial  system in  serious 
jeopardy. 
Five years after the eruption of the debt crisis most of the developing 
world is still struggling to get back on its feet. Although the collapse 
of  the world  financial  system predicted  by  some overly pessimistic 
observers has not materialized, the debt crisis is far from over. In fact, 
when traditional creditworthiness indicators, such as debt-exports or 
debt-service ratios are analyzed, the highly indebted countries are now 
in  an even weaker  position than in  1982 (see table 4.1). It has now 
become apparent that a long-term resolution of the debt problems will 
be a painful  and protracted process that will still require major addi- 
tional adjustment efforts by the indebted countries,  as  well as  extensive 
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159 Table 4.1  Creditworthiness Indicators for Developing Countries: 1974-88 
1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 
A. Ratio of  Externul Debt to Exports of  Goods and Srrvices (%) 
All developing countries  90.8  81.6  94.6  120.1  133.3  133.7  147.8  167.5  168.6  160.7 
15 highly indebted"  182.3  167.1  201.3  269.8  289.6  272.1  284.2  337.9  349.6  324.7 
Western Hemisphere  197.7  183.5  210.3  273.8  290.3  277.1  295.5  354.7  367.6  342.2 
B. Debt Service Ratios to Exports qf  Goods and  Services (%) 
All LDCs  14.1  12.9  16.2  19.5  18.9  20.1  20.5  22.4  20.7  20.0 
I5 highly indebteda  34.7  29.6  39.0  49.4  42.5  41.1  38.7  43.9  40.7  39.5 
Western Hemisphere  39.6  33.4  41.9  51.0  43.9  41.7  38.7  45.6  44.9  40.9 
Source: IMF's  World Economic Outlook, April,  1987. 
"Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ivory Coast, Ecuador, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. 161  Structural Adjustment Policies in Highly Indebted Countries 
negotiations between debtor governments, creditor governments, the 
multilateral institutions, and the banks. 
The adjustment approaches followed until now by most of the highly 
indebted countries can best be described as emergency stabilization 
programs geared towards generating very large trade balance surpluses 
in  very  short periods of time.  Given the new circumstances and the 
sudden halt in external financing after 1982, these countries had little 
choice but to use every possible tool at their disposal to achieve the 
needed turnaround in  their current accounts. As a consequence the 
adjustment process has been quite costly, generating drastic declines 
in real income and important increases in unemployment. In fact, as 
is reflected  in table 4.2, in a number of  Latin American countries in 
1986 real per capita GDP was below its 1970 level! 
A long-run solution to the debt crisis problem would entail (a) the 
regaining  of  creditworthiness by  these countries, and  thus the  re- 
sumption of voluntary lending by the international financial community; 
and (b) the resumption of sustained growth.' Much of the recent policy 
literature on the debt crisis has focused on these issues, with some of 
the discussion dealing with the type of long-run structural reforms the 
debt-troubled countries should implement in order to attain the dual 
objective of improved creditworthiness and growth. Most of this lit- 
erature has recommended very  conventional  measures, what econo- 
mists  had  been  advocating  for a  long time  prior  to the debt crisis, 
including trade liberalization, financial reform, major devaluations, and 
a reduced role for the government.2  For example, this policy package 
is the core of the conditionality contemplated by the Baker plan. Sur- 
prisingly, there have been very few attempts to evaluate whether the 
design of these traditional policies, and in particular their speed and 
sequencing, should be altered in the presence of a major debt problem 
and, in some cases, still significant macroeconomic disequilibria. 
Table 4.2  Index of  Real Gross Domestic Product Per Capita In Selected Latin 
American Countries (1970 = 100) 

















































































Source: CEPAL, Anuario Estadistico de Ame'rica Latina y el Caribe, 1985 and CEPAL,  Balance 
Preliminar de la Economia Latinoamericana, 1986. 162  Sebastian Edwards 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze a number of issues related 
to structural adjustment in the highly  indebted developing countries. 
The chapter starts with a brief discussion of the main features of the 
adjustment process followed during 1982-87.  I note that in spite of the 
major involvement of the IMF in this first phase of the adjustment, the 
actual policy packages implemented by most of the debt troubled coun- 
tries differed markedly from what we can describe as an orthodox IMF- 
type stabilization program. I argue that the “unorthodox” elements of 
the stabilization programs, such as the imposition of exchange controls 
and  trade restrictions, responded to the emergency  nature of  these 
programs.  I then discuss at a more analytical level some longer-term 
aspects of structural adjustment reforms, focusing on the relation be- 
tween outward orientation, export promotion, and trade liberalization. 
Emphasis is placed on the sequencing and speed of the structural re- 
forms related to the external sector. Lessons drawn from the recent 
Southern Cone experiments with trade liberalization are incorporated 
into the analysis of the possible effects of tariff reforms on employment, 
income, and growth. I also discuss the role of devaluations in structural 
adjustment processes in the same section. Since the chapter focuses 
on the role of the adjustment programs implemented by the countries 
themselves, relatively little emphasis is given to the role of banks and 
the international financial community. 
4.2  The Nature of  the Adjustment, 1982-87 
In this section I analyze the main features of the adjustment process 
followed by the highly indebted countries during 1982-87.3 Given the 
great diversity of experience of the various countries, it is not possible 
to make sweeping generalizations;  in fact, doing so would grossly over- 
simplify the discussion. When possible I point out the more important 
differences across countries. 
4.2.1  Origins of the Crisis 
During the second half of the 1970s and the early 1980s most of the 
developing nations embarked on a foreign borrowing binge.  Between 
1975 and 1982 the developing world’s long-term foreign debt more than 
tripled, growing from $162.5 billion to $551.2 billion; in  1982 the total 
foreign debt of the developing world, including  short-term debt and 
use of IMF credit, stood at $738.7 billion. Naturally, this huge increase 
in indebtedness was made possible by the liberal way in which, after 
the first oil shock in  1973, the international  financial community and 
in particular the banks, provided funds to these countries. There is no 
doubt that the pace at which the developing countries were accumu- 
lating debt in the late  1970s and early 1980s-at  a rate exceeding 20 
percent per year-was  not  sustainable in the medium to longer run; 163  Structural Adjustment Policies in Highly Indebted Countries 
some type of adjustment was bound to take place. The world, however, 
was astonished by  the severity of the crisis; instead of there being an 
orderly and slow reduction in the flow of borrowing, there was a major 
crisis that brought capital flows to a virtual halt. 
The causes behind the spectacular growth in borrowing during the 
1974-82 period varied from country to country. In Brazil, for example, 
it responded  to a deliberate development strategy adopted after the 
1973 oil shock. This policy was based on import substitution supple- 
mented with a heavy reliance on foreign borrowing to finance major 
investment projects.  In  Turkey, the accumulation  of  foreign indebt- 
edness responded mainly to the rapid growth of the public sector, which 
used  most of  the funds for investment purposes.  The situation was 
greatly aggravated by the existence of the so-called “convertible Turk- 
ish lira deposits,”  which provided a defacto, evergrowing subsidy to 
foreign borrowing. Contrary to most other countries, Turkey entered 
into a crisis in 1977, even before the second oil shock. In Mexico, the 
populist policies of the Echeverria and Lopez Portillo administrations, 
with spectacular growth in the public sector and in the fiscal deficit, 
lay behind the crisis. The discovery of additional oil reserves generated 
a wave of optimism that greatly influenced the magnitude of  the ex- 
penditure binge. It has been argued that approximately one half of the 
Mexican debt accumulated during the Lopez Portillo administration 
went to finance capital flight (Buffie and Sangines 1987). In Chile, on 
the other hand, fiscal policies played no role in the unleashing of the 
crisis; most of the huge increase in Chile’s foreign debt was contracted 
by the private sector with no government guarantees. The opening up 
of  the Chilean economy, as part of  the overall project  of  economic 
liberalization of  the Pinochet government, allowed the private sector 
to finance huge increases in consumption-especially of durables-with 
borrowing from abr~ad.~  In spite of their different experiences during 
the 1970s, by late 1982 all these countries faced a severe cut in foreign 
financing; they had come to share the harsh reality of the debt crisis. 
In the years to follow their experiences would again differ, as they 
tended to follow somewhat different adjustment programs. 
The behavior of  the world economy during the early  1980s, and in 
particular the increase of interest rates, the decline in commodity prices, 
and the sluggish growth of the industrial countries, played an important 
role in determining the magnitude and timing of  the cri~is.~  A recent 
study by CEPAL has estimated that for the Latin American nations, 
the deterioration of unit prices of non-oil exports and the hike in world 
interest rates “explain” almost 50 percent of the increase in the region’s 
current account deficit during 1981 and 1982.6 
The magnitude of external shocks can be better understood by ana- 
lyzing the evolution of the real interest rate “relevant” for these coun- 
tries, computed as nominal LIBOR (London Interbank offer rate for 164  Sebastian Edwards 
dollar deposits) deflated by the rate of inflation of  their exports. This 
concept of real interest rate combines in one indicator the effects of 
both the higher international nominal interest rates and the lower com- 
modity export prices, For the case of Latin America, this measure of 
the real interest rate jumped from an average of  -3.4  percent during 
1970-80 to 19.9 percent in 1981, 27.5 percent in 1982, and 17.4 percent 
in 1983. During the early 1980s even those countries with a large per- 
centage of their debt contracted at fixed concessionary terms experi- 
enced dramatic increases in their interest bill. For example, as a result 
of the higher world interest rates, the Ivory Coast’s interest payments 
increased from 3.1 percent of GDP in  1980 to more than 8 percent of 
GDP in  1983. 
The adoption of inadequate exchange rate policies constitutes one 
of the most important domestic causes of the crisis; most of the coun- 
tries  that eventually  experienced payments difficulties allowed their 
real exchange rates to become highly overvalued during the late 1970s 
and early  1980s.’ The case of the countries of the Southern Cone of 
South America is a primary example of inadequate exchange rate pol- 
icies. In Chile, for example, after a period with a passive crawling peg, 
and as a way to bring down a stubborn inflationary process, the cur- 
rency was fixed to the U.S. dollar in June of 1979, at the 3dme time as 
wages were indexed to past inflation and capital controls were relaxed. 
As a result, the real exchange rate appreciated by more than 30 percent 
between  1979 and  mid-1982,  provoking  a major  deprotection of the 
domestic tradables sector and a gigantic current account deficit that 
exceeded 14 percent of GDP in 1981.8  Argentina and Uruguay adopted 
a declining preannounced rate of devaluation, also as a way to reduce 
inflation.  However, contrary to the case of  Chile, in  Argentina  and 
Uruguay the predetermined rate of devaluation was clearly inconsistent 
with the magnitude of  their fiscal deficit. This resulted  not only in a 
substantial real appreciation, but also in a steady loss of credibility in 
the sustainability of the stabilization and liberalization programs, and 
in major capital flight.9 
In Mexico, as a result of a highly expansive fiscal policy, which was 
coupled  with  a quasi-fixed  nominal exchange rate, the effective real 
exchange rate experienced a real appreciation that exceeded 40 percent 
between 1976 and February of 1982. In 1976-77  in an effort to put an 
end to an acute situation of real exchange rate overvaluation, the Mex- 
ican peso was devalued by almost 80 percent relative to the U.S. dollar. 
By  1981, however,  the real  value of the peso was already  below  its 
1976 level; in less than 5 years more than 100 percent of the real effect 
of the devaluation had fully eroded. This case is particularly interesting 
since it clearly illustrates the difficulties that developing nations have 
many times faced when trying to engineer a real devaluation (see Ed- 
wards 1987). 165  Structural Adjustment Policies in Highly Indebted Countries 
The mismanagement  of exchange rate policy  was by  no means a 
monopoly  of the Latin American  countries. For example, the Ivory 
Coast, the Philippines, and Nigeria, among the highly indebted coun- 
tries, also experienced important degrees of real exchange rate over- 
valuation during the period preceding the crisis. In both the Ivory Coast 
and the Philippines real appreciation exceeded 15 percent between 1978 
and  1982, while in  Nigeria it  boardered  10 percent during the same 
period. 
The exchange rate policy  was not inadequate in every developing 
country, however.  In Colombia, Indonesia, and Korea, for example, 
the adoption of an active exchange rate management, including periodic 
devaluations, was an important component in overall strategies aimed 
at reducing the effects of world economic fluctuations. In that regard, 
Indonesia's exchange rate and macro policies were quite successful as 
a means to combat the Dutch disease effects associated with the oil 
booms. Also, Colombia's  pragmatic approach towards exchange rate 
management allowed the country to avoid the deprotection effects of 
the coffee boom of  1975-79  and to maintain a reasonable macroeco- 
nomic equilibrium.'O 
Perhaps one of the most devastating effects of the generalized ten- 
dency towards overvaluation is that it fueled massive capital flight out 
of  the developing world. In  country after country, as it became in- 
creasingly apparent that the overvaluation was unsustainable in  the 
longer run, the public began  to speculate heavily against the central 
bank by acquiring foreign exchange and moving it abroad. Moreover, 
in some countries, such as Chile and Argentina, the overvaluation cast 
doubts on the continuity of an overall development strategy based on 
liberalization and open markets. In Chile the public began to expect a 
hike in import tariffs and tried to anticipate it by acquiring imported 
durables in record quantities  (Edwards and Cox-Edwards 1987). Al- 
though because of its semi-illegal nature it is not easy to find official 
data on capital flight,  most available  estimates concur in  suggesting 
that in most of the Latin American countries there was a significant 
increase in capital flight during the years surrounding the debt crisis. 
In a recent empirical study Cuddington  (1986) found that there is a 
significant relation between overvaluation and capital flight. Table 4.3 
contains estimates on capital flight for six developing countries. There 
is an interesting contrast between the Latin American and the Asian 
nations. In particular notice that in Korea, a country that by and large 
avoided the temptation  of real exchange rate overvaluation, between 
1979 and 1984 capital flight was, on average, negative. 
4.2.2  The Adjustment 
In August of 1982, immediately following Mexico's formal announce- 
ment that it was facing serious financial difficulties, the international 166  Sebastian Edwards 
Table 4.3  Estimates of Capital Flight in Selected Developing CountriesP 
(billions of U.S.$) 
1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984 
Argentina  2.2  3.5  4.5  7.6  I .3  -  3.4 
Brazil  1.3  2.0  -  1.4  I .8  0.5  4.0 
Mexico  -1.1  2.2  2.6  4.7  9.3  2.6 
Venezuela  3.0  4.8  5.4  3.2  3.1  4.0 
Korea  -0.5  -0.7  -  0.8  0.5  -0.7  -  0.6 
Philippines  0.0  -0. I  I .3  0.0  -  1.5  -  1.8 
Source: Cumby and Levich (1987). 
"These estimates use William Cline's definition of capital flight as computed by Cumby 
and Levich. 
financial community greatly reduced the amount of funds intermediated 
to the developing world. Even countries such as Colombia-which  had 
not faced  payments problems,  had  no  serious macroeconomic  dis- 
equilibria,  and had  not accumulated debt at a very fast pace-were 
affected  by this reduction in foreign lending.  In fact, it is fair to say 
that the availability of foreign funds was reduced in a brutal way. For 
the developing world  as a whole  external financing was reduced by 
almost 40 percent between 1981 and 1983. Moreover, the major debtors 
were forced to fully  close a current account deficit,  which  in  1982 
exceeded $50 billion, in less than 3 years. By 1985 the aggregate current 
account had  reached virtual equilibrium  ( -  $0.1 billion).  In order to 
achieve this  significant adjustment, these countries had to engineer a 
major turnaround in their trade balance, which went from an aggregate 
deficit of almost $7 billion in 1981 to a surplus of more than $40 billion 
in 1984. Table 4.4 contains data on exports, imports, the trade balance, 
and the current account, that very vividly  capture the magnitude  of 
the adjustment. 
As can be seen from table 4.4 after reaching a record level in  1984 
(almost  $44 billion) the aggregate  trade surplus of the major debtors 
has experienced a steady decline and it is expected that in 1988 it will 
be just over $22 billion. This rapid deterioration in the aggregate trade 
balance is to a large part a reflection  of  the Brazilian  and Mexican 
situations. 
Latin America was severely affected by the sudden unavailability of 
loans. Table 4.5 contains data on the net transfer of resources to the 
region  from  1973 to 1986. As can be  seen, starting in  1982 the net 
transfer of resources became significantly negative; between 1982 and 
1986 the annual net  transfer averaged  -$26.4  billion,  compared to a 
positive  yearly  average net transfer of more than $12 billion  between 
1976 and 1971. In real terms the net turnaround of  resource transfers 167  Structural Adjustment Policies in Highly Indebted Countries 
Table 4.4  Current Account and Trade Balance for 15 Highly Indebted 
Countries: 1979-88  (billions of U.S.$) 
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-  10.5 
Source: IMF's World Economic Outlook (April 1987). 
Table 4.5  Capital Inflows and Net Transfer of  Resources in Latin America: 
1976-86  (billions of U.S.$) 




1976  17.9  6.8 
1977  17.2  8.2 
1978  26.2  10.2 
1979  29.1  13.6 
1980  29.4  17.9 
1981  37.5  27. I 
1982  20.0  38.7  -  18.7 
1983  3.2  34.3  -31.2 
1984  9.2  36.2 
1985  2.4  35.3  -  32.9 
1986  8.6  30.7  -  22.1 
Source: CEPAL (1986b, table 14). 
exceeded $70 billion in the short period of  three years between  1980 
and 1983! 
These very rapid adjustments in the current account and trade bal- 
ance were achieved  in all  cases by  reductions in  imports and in in- 
vestment. As can be seen from table 4.4 in the highly indebted countries 
the nominal dollar value of  exports was lower in  1986 than in  1980, 
with the magnitude of this decline exceeding 15 percent. This drop was 
basically the result of a decline of almost 25 percent in the export prices 
of these countries between  1980 and  1986. In Latin America the de- 
terioration of  the terms of trade was so severe (see table 4.6), that in 
spite of  an increase in the quantity of  exports of 30  percent between 
1980 and 1986, 100 percent of the net adjustment of the trade balance 
improvement has also been achieved by means of a reduction of imports. Table 4.6  Terms of Trade in Latin America Between 1981 and 1986 (Index, 1980 = 100) 
Cumulative 
Rate 
Index  Rate of  Change (%)  of  Change (9 
I984  1985  1986  1981-86 
Latin America 
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For the major debtors as a group, investment declined from an av- 
erage of 26 percent of GDP in  1973-77  to an average of  17.2 percent 
in 1983-86.  Table 4.7 contains data on investment ratios for a selected 
group of countries. As can be seen, with the exception of Chile, which 
started from an exceedingly weak position, in all of these countries the 
gross investment ratio declined significantly after the crisis, with the 
cases of  Nigeria,  the Philippines,  and Venezuela  being  particularly 
dramatic. In most cases public investment and investment in the con- 
struction sector were the components more severely curtailed. In the 
case of  public  investment this  was a  result  of  restrictive  aggregate 
demand policies implemented immediately after the crisis. Naturally, 
this decline in investment has serious consequences for the prospects 
of renewed growth. Not only has the adjustment been costly in terms 
of current output and employment, but also in terms of future income. 
Most  countries faced the need to reverse the direction  of the net 
transfers by  resorting to a combination  of expenditure-reducing and 
expenditure-switching  policies, including devaluation, the imposition 
of capital controls, and import quotas. The adjustment required both 
a significant increase in real interest rates as well as major relative price 
changes or real devaluations. In most cases the selection  of  policy 
packages was based on the perceived “effectiveness” of these policies 
in  the  short run, rather than on efficiency,  income distribution, or 
welfare considerations. As a result of the efforts made to implement 
rapidly  effective  policies,  a  number of  trade-offs  between different 
objectives-including  improvement in  the current account and infla- 
tion-emerged during the process. 
In most countries the expenditure-reducing  policies have been cen- 
tered on efforts to cut public expenditure. In a number of cases the 
Table 4.7  Gross Investment as Percentage of  GDP in Selected Debtor 
Countries 































Source: International Monetary Fund. 
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reduction of real public expenditure has been in fact very significant, 
with most of the cuts concentrating on public investment and govern- 
ment employees wages. According to CEPAL, in Argentina, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela government expenditure was cut by 
more than 20 percent in real terms following the crisis.I1  Similarly, in 
Morocco real  expenditure of the central government declined by  18 
percent between 1982 and 1984, while in the Philippines this reduction 
exceeded 25  percent between 1982 and 1985.12 
In spite of the effort to reduce overall public expenditures, govern- 
ment  interest payments on the domestic and foreign debt increased 
quite significantly during the first five years of the adjustment process. 
This was a result of both the real devaluations engineered as part of 
the stabilization programs and of the deliberate policy of raising do- 
mestic interest rates in an effort to further curb aggregate expenditure. 
The negative effects of the devaluations on the interest bills of different 
governments are a good illustration of the trade-offs involved in the 
adjustment process. In the majority of the major debtors most of the 
foreign debt is owed  by  the government, either because the public 
sector originally contracted it, or because it took it over when the local 
private banking system collapsed, as  in Chile.  l3 What real devaluations 
do is raise the (real) domestic currency cost to the government of raising 
the required funds to pay the interest bill. This effect has been signif- 
icant  in  countries like Argentina,  Mexico, and Peru, where interest 
payments on public-sector  foreign debt are a  high  proportion (i.e., 
approximately 20 percent) of total government expenditure.14 In a num- 
ber of countries, most notably  in  Argentina and Chile, the exchange 
rate policies  followed  during  this  period  also became an important 
source of government expenditures. For example, in Argentina,  the 
need to cover the exchange rate guarantee after the abandonment of 
the “tablita” generated staggering fiscal outlays. Similarly the adoption 
of a preferential (lower) exchange rate for foreign currency debtors in 
Chile resulted  in an implicit subsidy that absorbed large amounts of 
foreign resources.  l5 
In spite of the relatively  successful efforts to reduce public expen- 
ditures, fiscal deficits increased in relation to the precrisis period in the 
major debtors as a group (see table 4.8). This was mainly due to the 
fact that in many of these countries total tax revenues were negatively 
affected by the recessions that followed the crisis. The steep increase 
in interest rates that took place in most countries also impacted neg- 
atively the fiscal accounts, by means of its effect on the public-sector 
domestic debt. Moreover,  in most cases the  sources of fiscal deficit 
financing were affected by the crisis. Up to 1982 in most instances the 
public-sector deficits were financed by foreign borrowing. The drying 
up of this source of funds forced the local governments to turn to the 
inflationary tax and to issuing additional domestic public debt. 171  Structural Adjustment Policies in  Highly Indebted Countries 
Table 4.8  Monetary Policy, Fiscal Policy, and Inflation in Highly Indebted 
Countries 
Central Government 
Annual Percentage  Fiscal Deficits as  Average Percentage 









































Source: International Monetary Fund. 
AAverage annual inflation for 1969-78  was 28.5 percent. 
The need to use inflationary financing placed pressure on the mon- 
etary and  domestic credit policies  which  became significantly more 
expansive than the IMF, the World Bank, and the private bank officials 
felt they should have been. Table 4.8 contains summary data on mon- 
etary policy, the fiscal deficit, and the average rate of inflation in these 
countries. These data quite clearly illustrate some of the most inter- 
esting features of the emergency phase of the adjustment process. As 
is pointed out in more detail below, contrary to the historical experience 
with IMF sponsored programs, these have been stabilization programs 
with acceleration in monetary expansion, persistent high fiscal deficits 
that largely exceed the levels that prevailed before the crisis, and very 
high inflation. 
The restraint of wage increases was, in most countries, another major 
component of the expenditure-reducing  package. Table  4.9 contains 
data on the evolution of real wages in selected Latin American coun- 
tries.  As can be seen, with  the exception of Argentina,  Brazil,  and 
Colombia, the decline in real wages has been significant. 
In most countries the adjustment also relied on higher real interest 
rates, which helped keep expenditure, and in particular investment, in 
check. It should be noted, however, that in some cases the rise in real 
interest rates began some time before the “official”  unleashing of the 
debt crisis  in  August of  1982. For example, in  the countries of the 
Southern Cone, real interest rates began to climb quickly in mid-1981 
as these economies were becoming clearly overheated; higher interest 
rates were in fact an early  sign that in these countries the need for 
adjustment was quickly approaching. In Argentina the annual real lend- 
ing rate had  already  reached 19.3 percent in  1981, a figure that was 172  Sebastian Edwards 
Table 4.9  Evolution of  Real Wages in Selected Latin American Countries 
(percentage variation) 










-  10.6  -  10.4  25.5  26.4  -15.2 
8.5  12.1  -7.3  -6.7  7.1 
-  11.7  -  19.8  10.9  7.8  8.9 
1.4  3.4  5.2  7.4  -2.9 
9.1  -0.4  -  10.6  0.3  -4.5 
-13.8  -11.9  -16.2  -1.3  -3.2 
3.6  0.8  -22.7  -6.2  1.2 
-1.7  2.3  16.8  -  15.2  -15.3 




-  7.8 
-  14.8 
-  39.2 
-  26.1 
-  38.9 
-  18.1 
Source: CEPAL (1986b). 
"As the crisis  did  not begin  simultaneously in  all  the countries included, cumulative 
variations have been calculated over different periods in order to reflect the impact of 
adjustment on real wages more accurately. Figures in this column thus show the variation 
registered between  1980 and 1985 for Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay. 
significantly higher than the average of 1.5  percent that prevailed during 
1978-80.  In 1982 and 1983, as the effects of the debt crisis per se were 
being  felt,  the real  lending  interest rates  remained  high  (around 12 
percent per annum) but not as high as the level attained in 1981. Chile 
presents a similar case, as in 1981 the annual real interest rate reached 
58.1 percent, a figure  much higher than the average of the previous 
two years (8.5 percent). During  1982 and  1983 the real lending  rate 
declined to the still remarkable level of 16 percent per annum (Ramos 
1986). 
Although in  the Southern Cone real  interest rates began  climbing 
almost a whole year before August 1982, the debt crisis further shocked 
the already weakened  financial sector. In particular,  in Chile the halt 
of capital inflows was partially responsible for the timing and magnitude 
of the financial debacle of late 1982 and 1983. By the end of 1982 the 
foreign debt of the Chilean banking system exceeded 6.6 billion in U.S. 
dollars,  a remarkable figure when compared to the mere $0.6 billion 
(U.S.) of  debt in  1978! These funds had  been obtained without any 
government guarantee and had mainly been used to finance the oper- 
ations of the large  private  conglomerates-the  so-called grupos. By 
mid-1982 a large proportion of these loans were in fact bad loans, as 
owing to a number of factors including the real overvaluation of the 
peso, the grupos were facing very difficult financial times. During 1982 
the amount of foreign funds available to the Chilean banks was reduced 
by more than 75 percent, generating a fatal blow to the troubled financial 
sector. As a result of these difficulties, in January 1983 the government 
stepped in, liquidating two banks and nationalizing others. Responding 173  Structural Adjustment Policies in Highly Indebted Countries 
to pressures by the international banks the Chilean government decided 
to take over these banks’ foreign debt, guaranteeing its payment. Par- 
adoxically, at the end of 1983 the Chilean financial sector was in some 
ways at the same juncture as it had been ten years before, in the midst 
of the Allende socialist government. It had been nationalized and was 
tightly controlled by the state (see Diaz-Alejandro  1985 Edwards and 
Cox-Edwards 1987). 
After  August  of  1982 most countries also relied  on expenditure- 
switching policies. These consisted in most cases of a combination of 
nominal devaluations and, at least initially, of a major escalation in the 
degree of trade restrictions. 
The extent of the devaluations varied from country to country and 
were particularly  severe in Latin America. In an effort to assure that 
the effects of the nominal devaluations on the real exchange rate did 
not erode through inflation, most countries adopted some kind of active 
exchange rate management where the exchange rate continued to be 
adjusted after the initial parity change. In fact, as of July 1986, out of 
the 15 major debtors 12 had some sort of crawling peg regime consisting 
of periodical adjustments of the nominal rate somewhat related to the 
differential between internal and external inflation. 
Another important feature of the exchange rate policy followed by 
many countries was the adoption of multiple exchange rates. This ba- 
sically served three purposes. First, by implementing differential  ex- 
change  rates  for  capital  and  current  account  transactions-as  in 
Venezuela-the  authorities hoped  to separate real transactions from 
the supposed volatility of capital movements. More important, how- 
ever, by imposing a free-floating exchange rate on unregistered capital 
flows the Venezuelan authorities tried to discourage capital flight with- 
out greatly affecting the current account. Second, multiple rates were 
also applied as a way  to supplement the protective system. Indeed, 
when different exchange rates are applied to different commercial trans- 
actions, the resulting outcome is perfectly equivalent to a differentiated 
tariff schedule. This practice was again used by Venezuela, as well as 
by Mexico. And third, in some countries, such as Mexico, Chile, and 
Venezuela,  a lower  “preferential”  exchange rate has applied to the 
private sector repayment of foreign debt. The rationale for this pref- 
erential  rate was that in  this way it  would  be possible  to avoid the 
general bankruptcy of the private sector, which had borrowed heavily 
from foreign banks at the previously fixed nominal exchange rate. 
Most countries were able to generate important real devaluations, 
which in some cases more than corrected the overvaluation that pre- 
ceded the crisis. In Turkey, for example, between 1982 and 1986 there 
was a 24 percent real  effective devaluation, while in the Philippines 
the real devaluation amounted to more than 8 percent. It was, however, 174  Sebastian Edwards 
Table 4.10  Real Effective Exchange Rate Indixes, 1980 = 100 (Trade Weight 
at 1980) 
Argentina  Bolivia  Brazil  Chile  Mexico  Peru  Venezuela 
1980  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
1981  99.1  I  79.75  84.06  85.52  87.97  85.77  89.00 
1982  177.98  58.21  77.60  92.00  112.34  81.15  80.66 
1983  188.62  71.15  91.10  115.91  132.97  85.59  75.51 
1984  139.35  28.42  102.65  118.12  114.66  87.91  105.67 
1985  173.78  9.5  103.85  145.52  106.22  101.91  104.81 
1986  203.71  103.93  111.68  162.39  135.61  84.98  100.81 
Note: An  increase of  this  index  indicates real  devaluation,  while a  decline is  a  real 
appreciation. These real  effective exchange rate indexes have been computed as the 
trade-weighted geometric average of the bilateral exchange rates adjusted by the ratio 
of domestic consumer price  index to the corresponding trade partner wholesale price 
index. 
in the Latin American countries that the more important turnarounds 
of real exchange rate behavior were achieved. As can be seen in table 
4.10, in all of these countries the real  effective exchange rate index 
shows that there have been significant real depreciations between 1982 
and 1986. 
As a result of these large nominal devaluations most countries ex- 
perienced important increases in their price levels. As noted above, in 
an effort to avoid the erosive effects of these price increases the Central 
Bank authorities decided to resort to further devaluations as a means 
of maintaining a high real exchange rate. Naturally this practice added 
fuel to the already accelerated rates of inflation (see table 4.11). 
Table 4.11  Rate of  Devaluation and Rate of  Inflation in Selected Debtor 
Countries 
Average Annual Devaluation  Average Annual  Inflation 




























Source: IMF, lnrernarional  Financial  Starisrics. 
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Immediately following the crisis in many (but not all) of the major 
debtors the devaluation policies were supplemented by the imposition 
of trade restrictions. Table 4.12, for example, presents data on some 
of the policies implemented by four countries. 
An important question is whether the use of quantitative restrictions 
(QRs) instead  of  tariffs  or more substantial devaluations during the 
initial  phases of the adjustment has introduced unduly  high costs in 
terms of growth and efficiency. A well-known proposition in the theory 
of commercial  policy  is that, in terms of welfare and income distri- 
bution, tariffs are generally superior instruments than quotas as a means 
to restrict trade.16 That type of analysis, however, is static and assumes 
perfect information on behalf of the authorities; according to this simple 
setting the relevant  elasticities  are known  and thus it is possible  to 
compute  the exact height of the desired tariff. In reality, however, things 
are quite different, since the magnitudes of elasticities are only known 
in a very imprecise way. This means that in order to achieve a certain 
volume of imports with the use of tariffs, it is necessary to go through 
a trial and error process. This type of procedure may be very ineffective 
in cases such as the debt crisis where the foreign exchange value of 
imports has to be  reduced very  quickly,  and where there are high 
penalties associated with surpassing that (much reduced) level of im- 
ports. For a small country that faces given foreign currency prices of 
imports, the use of quotas is an effective way of being sure that the 
value of imports (in foreign exchange) will not exceed a certain level. 
Table 4.12  Examples of  Additional Trade Restrictions during the 
1982-86 Period 
Argentina  1984:  Decree 4070. All imports require a permit. All imports 
competing with local production are subject to authorization 
(with consultations to domestic producers'  associations). 
Tariff surcharge of 10 percent over imports and 9 percent for 
exports. 
Import surcharges ranging from 4  to 28 percent imposed 'on 
more than 30 items. Also, two-tier exchange rate established 
Import tariffs raised from 10  percent to uniform 20 percent. 
Import tariffs temporarily hiked to 35 percent. 
The uniform import duty system is stabilized at 20 percent 
(from the earlier uniform level of  10  percent). 
QRs were imposed on all imports (during the 1970-80  decade 
QRs only affected 60 percent of imports). 
Venezuela  1983:  Foreign exchange controls and a two-tier official exchange-rate 
1985: 




Mexico  1982: 
system. QRs on 70 percent of final consumption goods. 
Source: The World Bank. 
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As long as countries need to establish credibility regarding their will- 
ingness to adjust, it is particularly important not to surpass the prees- 
tablished level of imports. 
Although there is some justification for the (very) short-term use of 
QRs in the very first phase of the adjustment, there are no good reasons 
for maintaining their use for long periods of time. From an efficiency 
perspective QRs have well-known undesirable  effects. For example, 
Buffie and Sangines (1987) have argued that the generalized use of QRs 
in Mexico in 1982-84  resulted in an unnecessary reduction of imports 
of intermediate inputs, which greatly hurt the Mexican economy. 
Some countries have recently relaxed trade restrictions, while others 
have announced some easing up for the near future. In Chile, for ex- 
ample, tariffs were reduced to a 20 percent uniform level. Mexico has 
taken some steps towards reducing the coverage of  licenses, while in 
Bolivia, as part of the stabilization program aimed at stopping hyper- 
inflation,  quotas have  been  abolished and tariffs  reduced. As is dis- 
cussed in  more  detail  below, in  many  countries trade liberalization 
packages are being discussed as a part of conditionality  agreements 
with the multilateral  institutions. 
In spite of  the significant efforts to adjust made by  most of  these 
countries-and  of the costs incurred in the process-the  magnitude of 
their trade surpluses has systematically fallen short of their interest 
payments.  In Latin  America, for example, in  1986 the interest bill 
amounted to 5.3 percent of GDP while the trade surplus reached 2.3 
percent of GDP. In most countries up to now this financing gap has 
been closed, usually after long and protracted negotiations, by packages 
of funds provided by the banks and the multilateral  institutions. It is 
important to notice, however, that the banks have been able to signif- 
icantly reduce their exposure to the major debtors in spite of the fact 
that they have made some contributions to financing these funds short- 
falls (see IMF 1987). 
Up to now banks have relied on the policing activities of the mul- 
tilateral  institutions,  and  in  particular of  the  IMF, for determining 
whether a particular country is making a “sufficient”  effort to adjust. 
A  question that is still unresolved is whether the banks will  make a 
serious commitment to providing additional financing to the indebted 
countries in the next few years. 
A number of studies have suggested that for the great majority  of 
the highly  indebted  countries it would not be possible to generate in 
the short run trade surpluses of a magnitude sufficient to cover interest 
payments without further decreasing  the level  of  real  consumption. 
Selowsky and van der Tak (1986), for example, have estimated that a 
“typical”  major debtor would  need  additional financing for approxi- 
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sumption (2 percent per year) and in real income (4 percent per year). 
Under these assumptions, since the rate of growth of income exceeds 
that of consumption, domestic savings rise continuously. According to 
this simulation  exercise after five  years “the typical”  major  debtor 
would start to amortize its debt. After six more years the debt would 
have been reduced to “normal”  levels, and the country would again 
be “creditworthy.” Cline (1987) has recently argued, along similar lines, 
that banks could and should indeed increase the amount of funds being 
intermediated to those countries that show progress in their adjustment 
efforts. 
4.2.3  Crisis Adjustment and Traditional Stabilization Programs 
The above discussion shows that, in spite of the active involvement 
of the International Monetary Fund, the programs followed by most 
of the major debtors between 1982 and 1986 differed  in a number of 
key respects from the typical IMF sponsored program of the pre-1982 
era. These differences mainly involve the selection of policy packages, 
as well as the availability of additional financing. Also, the behavior of 
the exogenous variables, including the international environment, has 
tended to differ from the historical experiences. 
According to Khan and Knight (1985) we can distinguish a macro- 
economic and a structural adjustment component in the typical IMF 
program. The macro or demand management package is mainly based 
on restrictive  monetary, fiscal, and domestic credit policies, aimed at 
eliminating the disequilibrium between aggregate demand and aggregate 
supply, improving the current account, and reducing inflation. Special 
emphasis is usually placed on the control of fiscal deficits. The struc- 
tural adjustment or resource reallocation package, on the other hand, 
usually  includes  three  main  policy  blocks:  (1)  trade liberalization, 
(2) financial reform, and (3) major devaluation including exchange rate 
unification in the case of multiple rates. 
The objectives of the structural adjustment component of conven- 
tional  programs  are to increase efficiency, raise investment, and en- 
hance  growth  opportunities.  Historically,  for  most  countries  the 
implementation of IMF sponsored programs has not taken place at the 
same time  that a  gigantic  foreign debt is being  serviced. Quite the 
contrary, it  has usually  been assumed that while  implementing  the 
structural reforms, these countries can command significant additional 
net funds from abroad (see Khan and Knight 1985). Although this may 
have been the case in the past, it is very far from today’s reality, when 
the highly indebted countries have to generate a significant net transfer 
of resources to the rest of the world. 178  Sebastian Edwards 
In terms of outcome, an historically “successful” IMF program can 
be described by a reduced fiscal deficit, lower inflation, more liberalized 
trade, and an improvement in the current account and balance of pay- 
ments. In many  ways  the current (1982-86)  adjustment looks  very 
different from this IMF blueprint. Generally speaking, and as is cap- 
tured by tables 4.8 and 4.11, this has been an inflationary adjustment 
process with high and persistent fiscal deficits. Additionally there has 
been an escalation in the degree of distortions of  the external sectors, 
with a profusion of QRs and multiple exchange rates. 
The behavior of investment has also been very different during the 
current crisis adjustment period when compared to the historical epi- 
sodes. In a detailed  study of 39 historical  episodes of structural ad- 
justment programs  between  1962 and  1982, Edwards  (forthcoming) 
found that for the group as a whole the investment ratio did not ex- 
perience  a significant decline in  any of the four years following the 
implementation of the programs. Moreover, according to this study, on 
average in these historical  episodes it is not possible to detect, as in 
the current case, significant declines in real output. 
To a large extent the “unorthodoxy” of these new stabilization and 
adjustment programs  can be attributed to three main factors: (1) the 
magnitude of the adjustment required, (2) the urgency  with which  it 
had  to be implemented, and  (3) the global nature of the crisis.  In a 
way, when faced with the trade-offs between current account correc- 
tions, efficiency of the adjustment, and inflation, these countries opted- 
or were forced to opt-for  the current account improvements placing, 
at least during the initial  phases of the process, little  priority on in- 
flation, efficiency, or costs. Implicitly the IMF endorsed or encouraged 
these adjustment programs, in spite of the fact that they departed from 
its  traditional  view.  Now,  however,  as things  are somewhat under 
control, more emphasis is indeed being placed on efficiency, growth, 
and other social costs. These issues are discussed in  more detail in 
section 4.3. 
4.3  Trade Liberalization and Adjustment with Growth 
The emergency packages implemented until now have succeeded in 
averting what some considered  to be an almost  sure collapse of the 
world financial system. This has been achieved, however, at a signif- 
icant cost for the major debtors in terms of decline in employment, 
income, and standard of living. The key question now is how to move 
from the current situation  towards what  we  can call  phase 2 of the 
adjustment process, a phase characterized by adjustment with growth. 
At a more  concrete level, the Baker and  the Bradley  plans, among 
other initiatives, clearly reflect the preoccupation of politicians with 
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A number of authors-and  indeed the supporters of the Baker plan, 
as well as the IMF-believe  that a rapid trade liberalization, coupled 
with devaluation, privatization, and financial reform, is the most rea- 
sonable strategy to achieve these objectives.  I8  For example, Balassa 
et al. (1986, 88) have recommended that, among other things, the de- 
veloping nations should eliminate all QRs and reduce, in a period of 
five years, imports tariffs to a uniform  15 to 20  percent; these tariff 
reforms should be coupled with significant devaluations in order not 
to  “deprotect”  the tradable goods sectors.19 To  a large extent these 
recommendations are very similar to what many economists have been 
advocating for  many  years  for the  developing  countries.  However, 
these new proposals are more drastic, in the  sense of  arguing for a 
bolder movement towards free trade. The current proposals on signif- 
icant trade liberalizations have not involved a detailed discussion of 
the important issues related to strategy, including the appropriate speed 
and sequencing of reform. Also, there has been little consideration on 
the possible short-run trade-offs between these liberalization reforms 
aimed  at  improving  efficiency  and  other  objectives  of  the  overall 
programs. 
Most of the traditional literature on trade liberalization has assumed 
that these reforms take place in the absence of a foreign debt overhang 
problem. Moreover, many writers have assumed that during the trade 
reform process countries will be able to attract substantial voluntary 
lending. McKinnon (1973, 1982), for example, has forcefully warned 
us of the dangers related to excessive capital inflows during a trade 
liberalization episode. However, it is clear that at the present time, in 
the vast majority of  LDCs there is very little danger of  trade liberali- 
zation attracting excessive (or indeed any) voluntary  capital inflows. 
Today, the problem is quite the opposite: Countries have to generate 
a positive resource transfer to the rest of the world. 
The purpose of this section is to analyze some specific issues related 
to trade reforms. I first discuss the relation between outward orien- 
tation, trade liberalization, and export promotion. I then analyze issues 
related  to the order and speed  of  reforms, focusing on the relation 
between stabilization policies and trade reforms and on the unemploy- 
ment effects of liberalization. Finally I deal with the role of devaluation 
and of credibility during a structural adjustment process. 
4.3.1  Outward Orientation, Export Promotion, 
and Trade Liberalization 
There is by now an impressive amount of  empirical evidence sug- 
gesting that countries that have adopted outward-oriented development 
policies, which emphasize export promotion, have outperformed those 
countries that have followed inward-oriented strategies based on import 
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outward policies-has  recently recognized that the excesses of import 
substitution have been very costly for Latin America: some of its senior 
staff members have recommended that in the future export promotion 
should play a more central role in that region’s development policies.20 
There seems to be relatively  less agreement, however, on whether 
“trade liberalization”  packages have played  an important role in the 
performance  of  the  outward-oriented economies. For example, in  a 
recent paper Sachs (1987) questioned the idea that trade liberalizations 
are indeed a required component of successful outward-oriented strat- 
egies. Making  reference to the experiences of the East-Asian coun- 
tries-Japan,  Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong-Sachs  argues 
that the success of these countries was to a large  extent due to an 
active role  of  government in  promoting  exports in  an environment 
where imports had  not  yet been fully liberalized,  and where macro- 
economic (and especially fiscal) equilibrium was fostered. Whether one 
agrees with  Sachs depends on how outward orientation, export pro- 
motion, and trade liberalization are defined. Recently some confusion 
has emerged regarding these concepts, and it is not exactly clear what 
people mean by them. 
In the more traditional policy literature of the 1960s and 1970s trade 
liberalization  was  defined  in  a  very  general  way: What  economists 
usually meant was some relaxation of trade and exchange controls. In 
fact, in the by now classic NBER study on trade regimes directed by 
Bhagwati and Krueger, a liberalization episode was defined as a more 
extensive use of the price mechanism that would reduce the anti-export 
bias of the trade regime.*’ In her 1986 review article on the problems 
of liberalization, Krueger went as far as saying that even a (real) de- 
valuation in  the presence of QRs constituted a liberalization episode. 
These are indeed very mild definitions of liberalization. In fact today 
very few people will raise an eyebrow about them. Only recently has 
“trade liberalization”  acquired a more drastic connotation, meaning 
(for many people) an elimination of QRs coupled with a severe reduc- 
tion of import tariffs to a uniform level of around 10 percent. Moreover, 
recently trade liberalization has, in many ways, become synonymous 
with free-market policies involving minimum or no government inter- 
vention at any level.** 
The difference between  the old and new definitions of trade liber- 
alization is, to a large extent, one of degree or intensity. While a de- 
valuation in the presence of QRs, or the replacement of QRs by (quasi) 
equivalent tariffs is a mild form of liberalization, the reduction of tariffs 
(with no QRs) to a uniform  10 percent or, for that matter, the complete 
elimination of tariffs is a very drastic liberalization. In order to clearly 
understand the different  issues  involved  in  policy  discussions it  is, 
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Unfortunately this  is  not always  done; the policy  literature  on the 
subject is plagued with imprecisions and ambiguities. 
There is  little doubt that a successful export promotion  policy  re- 
quires some kind of trade liberalization. In fact, the historical evidence 
clearly shows that those countries that have successfully embarked on 
that kind of strategy have had a more ‘‘liberal’’  trade regime than those 
countries following indiscriminatory import substitution. The success- 
ful outward-oriented countries have generally had lower coverage of 
prior  license  systems, lower average  tariffs,  less dispersion  in  their 
tariffs, and less episodes of real exchange rate over~aluation.~~ 
In a  recent major  multi-country  study by  the World  Bank  it  was 
found that there was a clear relation between movements toward more 
liberal  trade  systems and a  higher  performance (Papageorgiou,  Mi- 
chaely, and Choksi  1986). In that regard, the case of Korea-one of, 
if  not  the most  successful of  the export-oriented countries-is  very 
educating.  In 1985, for example, 90 percent of Korean imports were 
subject to automatic approval (Lee,  were not  subject to any form of 
QRs) and the average tariff rate was only 26 percent. Moreover, the 
tariff structure was characterized by higher tariffs concentrated on final 
goods, with capital equipment and intermediate inputs having relatively 
low degrees of prote~tion.~~  This extent of import protection was sig- 
nificantly below that of most of the developing nations and also below 
the degree of Korean protection in  1965, before the outward-oriented 
policy  was embraced. The Korean experience of  export promotion 
coupled  with  trade liberalization can be contrasted with the Chilean 
case. Between 1975 and 1979 a drastic trade liberalization that elimi- 
nated all QRs, and reduced tariffs to a uniform 10 percent in four years 
was  implemented  in  Chile; in  addition,  as part of  a  massive move 
towards free market orientation, this  period’s  policies  almost com- 
pletely  eliminated  the government’s role  in  defining external sector 
strategies. By allowing the real exchange rate to slip by approximately 
30 percent between 1979 and 1982, the Chilean experience of that period 
became one of ultra trade liberalization without export promotion (see 
Edwards and Cox-Edwards, 1987). 
Within  the Latin American  context Colombia after 1967  provides 
another educating example of successful export promotion with some 
trade liberalization. Until that year the Colombian external sector was 
highly  distorted and  had  been subject  to deep and recurrent crises; 
coffee exports provided  most  foreign exchange, and the Colombian 
economy was subject to the vagaries of the world coffee market. In 
1967 three major measures were taken. First, any attempt to fix the 
exchange rate was abandoned, and  a crawling peg  system aimed  at 
avoiding real  exchange rate overvaluation was adopted. Second, an 
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scheme-the  so-called CATS-and  the government export promotion 
office  (Proexpo) played  an important role. And  third, imports were 
greatly liberalized; in  1983 the average tariff in Colombia was only 29 
percent, while the proportion of  imports subject to QRs had greatly 
declined since 1967. As a consequence of these policies the Colombian 
noncoffee exports sector has performed  in  an efficient way,  helping 
Colombia sustain a vigorous growth rate during the last 20 years.25  In 
fact, today Colombia stands alone among the Latin American nations 
as a country that escaped the traumatic debt experience of the crisis 
while being able to maintain a reasonable rate of growth. 
Although the evidence supporting the merits of outward orientation 
is abundant, there is no well-developed theoretical model-or  empirical 
evidence for that matter-linking  very low (or zero) import tariffs to 
higher growth.26 Nor is there evidence suggesting that a completely 
“hands-off’’  policy on behalf of the government is the most desirable 
alternative. In fact, the success of the East Asian countries with export- 
led growth suggests that some selectively determined degree of inter- 
vention specially aimed at supporting exports, played a key role.*’ In 
this section  no attempt will  be made to solve the difficult  and  very 
important question of the optimal degree of government intervention, 
or of the optimal level and structure of import tariffs. This is indeed 
one of the most difficult question of economic policy, whose answer 
(even at the purely abstract and theoretical  level) will depend on the 
existence of other distortions, the completeness of markets, and the 
availability of other policy tools, among other things. Instead we will 
proceed under the assumption that in most of the highly indebted coun- 
tries the current structure of import protection is higher than the (un- 
known) optimal level and that, in the long run, these countries will gain 
from engaging in sume trade liberalization that is aimed at reducing 
import tariffs and making them uniform. Under these (very plausible) 
assumptions, in the rest of this section we will discuss specific issues 
dealing with the appropriate speed and sequencing of the trade liber- 
alization component of an outward-oriented strategy. 
4.3.2  Trade Liberalization with a Government Budget Constraint 
An important policy question is whether the trade liberalization com- 
ponent of an outward-oriented strategy should be attempted at the same 
time  as a  country is  embarked  on a  severe stabilization  and  anti- 
inflationary program.  Not surprisingly, the answer depends on the in- 
tensity of the trade reform and of the ongoing inflation. 
Historically, there has been a close link between mild trade liberal- 
izations  and  stabilization programs.28 Consider the following typical 
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dium trade liberalization effort:29  At some point in time the authorities 
of a particular country decide to pursue a fiscal policy that is incon- 
sistent with the chosen nominal exchange rate regime, usually a pegged 
rate. Given the underdeveloped nature of the domestic capital market, 
the fiscal expansion is basically financed with domestic credit creation. 
As a  result, there will  be a loss of international  reserves; domestic 
inflation will  exceed world inflation, and the real  exchange rate will 
become increasingly overvalued. In an effort to stop the drainage of 
reserves the authorities will  usually  respond by  imposing exchange 
controls and by increasing the degree of restrictiveness of the existing 
trade  impediments:  tariffs  will  be hiked  and QRs will  be imposed. 
Naturally, as long as the ultimate causes of the macroeconomic dis- 
equilibrium-that  is, the inconsistent credit and fiscal policies-are  not 
tackled, all the authorities will gain by imposing new trade restrictions 
is a delay in the need for corrective macroeconomic measures. The 
real exchange rate will become more overvalued, international reserves 
will continue to decline, and a black market for foreign exchange will 
emerge. At  some point this disequilibrium situation will  become un- 
sustainable, and a stabilization program, usually under the aegis of the 
IMF, will be enacted. This program will usually consist of a significant 
nominal devaluation geared at correcting the overvaluation developed 
in the previous period, of a contractionary macroeconomic policy, and 
of a liberalization of trade restrictions aimed at dismantling those con- 
trols  imposed  during the expansionary phase of  the process. These 
types of trade liberalizations have historically been mild and have sel- 
dom consisted of complete elimination of QRs and major tariff reduc- 
tions of the kind now recommended for the indebted countries.30 
Table 4.13 contains a summary on the evolution of trade exchange 
and capital controls in the period immediately following the adoption 
of  14 major Latin American stabilization episodes. In determining the 
timing of these programs, the implementation  of  the major nominal 
devaluation  was taken as defining  the beginning of the program. As 
may be seen, in many countries there were mild, and sometimes short- 
lived liberalizations; out of these 14 episodes we do not find a single 
major liberalization attempt. 
Perhaps Chile during 1975-81  constitutes the most notable case of 
a major liberalization undertaken in  conjunction  with a major  stabi- 
lization effort. The trade liberalization that eventually  eliminated all 
QRs and reduced tariffs to a uniform  10 percent level was pursued at 
the same time as inflation was being reduced from 400 percent to 10 
percent.3' The Chilean episode illustrates very vividly one of the most 
serious trade-offs that emerges when a major liberalization is under- 
taken at the same time as a major anti-inflation program. As in most 
successful  stabilization  programs, in  the  last  phase  of  the  Chilean 184  Sebastian Edwards 
Table 4.13  Summary of  Evolution of Exchange Controls and Trade 
Restrictions after Enactment of Stabilization Programs in  Selected 
Latin American Countries 
Payments  Tariffs,  Restrictions 
Country  Year  Current Transactions  Related Measures  Transactions 
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Table 4.13  (continued) 
Payments  Tariffs,  Restrictions 
Restrictions  on  Duties, and Cost-  on Capital 
Country  Year  Current Transactions  Related Measures  Transactions 
Nicaragua  1979  Very  slight  No changes  Very  sharp 
liberalization  increase in 
degree of 
restrictions 
Peru  1967  Increased  Tariffs raised  Sharp 
restrictiveness  increase in 
restrictions 
Peru  1975  No significant  Increase in tariffs  Slight 
change  levels  liberalization 
Venezuela  1964  Slight increase  in  No change  No change 
restrictiveness 
Source: Constructed from information obtained from various issues of the IMF's Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions and from various issues 
of Pick's Yearbook and World Currencies Yearbook. 
stabilization effort when inflation  was reduced from 40 percent to 9 
percent per annum, there was a significant real exchange rate appre- 
ciation that reduced the degree  of  competitiveness of  the tradables 
sector at a time when, because of the trade reform among other factors, 
the equilibrium real exchange rate had  significantly depreciated. In 
the Chilean case this real appreciation was partially the result of  the 
active use of exchange rate management  to bring down inflation;  in 
mid-1979 the nominal  exchange rate was fixed relative to the dollar. 
As is well known by now this real appreciation played an important 
role in the disappointing outcome of  the Chilean episode; it seriously 
deprotected the tradables sector, it generated perverse expectations 
of devaluation and, ultimately, it conspired with the high real interest 
rates to provoke the worst financial debacle of Chilean history  (Ed- 
wards and Cox-Edwards 1987). 
A crucial objective of any stabilization program and, as pointed out 
in section 4.2, indeed of those undertaken by the major debtors, is to 
reduce the magnitude of the fiscal deficit. Many times there will be an 
important trade-off between a trade liberalization that reduces import 
tariffs and the achievement of this fiscal objective. Surprisingly, the pol- 
icy and theoretical literatures on trade liberalization policies have most 
times tended to ignore the fiscal role of tariffs in the developing nations. 
Most theoretical and policy discussions on trade liberalization assume, 
along the lines of traditional trade theory, that tariff proceeds are handed 
back to the public. In reality, however, things are very different, with 
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particularly the case in many of the poorer developing countries where 
for different institutional reasons taxes on international trade represent 
a high percentage of government revenue. Table 4.14, for example, con- 
tains data on the fiscal importance of taxes on international trade for 
eight countries. As may be seen, taxes on trade are as high as one-third 
of the total revenue of the central government. 
As long as tariff rates are below the maximum revenue tariff, there 
will be a trade-off  between trade liberalization and the generation  of 
the government surplus required to finance debt servicing. While the 
reduction of  tariffs will generally reduce distortions, it will also have 
a negative effect on government finances. What is required, then, is to 
replace trade restrictions by less distortive taxes that can generate the 
same (or a higher)  amount of  revenue. This, of course, means that 
major reforms of the tax system would be required in most countries. 
As  long as this tax reform effort also focuses on efficiency aspects, it 
will  tend to be concentrated on the imposition of a value-added  tax 
(VAT), among other taxes. This is not easy and takes time, as a number 
of efforts to implement sweeping tax reforms have recently shown. Tax 
reforms are not only politically difficult to have approved, but from an 
administrative  perspective  it is many times very difficult to get them 
going. This is particularly  the case in the poorer countries where the 
preexisting  tax system is  extremely rudimentary.  Indeed the recent 
Indonesian tax reform has very clearly shown the difficulties involved 
in these types of efforts. (See Conrad and Gillis  1984). However, in 
middle  income  countries where there is an operating  tax system of 
some sophistication,  a major tax reform can be implemented with some 
speed. The Chilean tax reform of 1975 is, in that sense, a good example; 
Table 4.14  Taxes on International Trade as a Percentage of Government 









Import Tariffs  1'  ( 
Total Tax Revenue  Total Revenue 
4.9%  13.3% 
25.6  30.0 
13.4  10.8 
3.5  3.3 
16.1  14.0 
3.0  2.7 
10.2  n.a. 
22.1  23.7 
Source: Constructed from raw data from the International Monetary Fund's Government 
Finances Slutistics  Yeurbook. 
"Refers to central government. 
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in  little over a year a major tax overhaul that introduced  a VAT,  full 
indexation, and  unification  of  corporate and noncorporate tax rates 
was successfully implemented (Corbo, de Melo, and Tybout 1986). 
Although in most cases the implementation  of a major tax reform 
will  take a  substantial amount of time, there are some policies  con- 
ducive both towards improved  efficiency and higher revenues in the 
short run. The most obvious one is  the replacement of  QRs, (i.e., 
licenses, prohibitions, and so on) by import tariffs. A well-known fea- 
ture of QRs is that unless they are auctioned, the government misses 
the revenue associated with the trade restriction. By replacing the QR 
by a tariff it is possible for the government to recapture this revenue. 
The replacement of QRs by tariffs has two other potentially desire- 
able effects. First, there is a potential for a positive effect on income 
distribution. This is be cause in most cases large (or even multinational) 
firms or large established merchants get the import licenses and, thus, 
the rents. By replacing the QRs by tariffs these rents are passed on to 
the government, allowing it to reduce other taxes, or even increase 
expenditures on social programs. Second, the replacement of tariffs by 
QRs will generally increase the effectiveness of devaluations. The rea- 
son is that the effects of devaluations are significantly different under 
quantity rationing (i.e,, import quotas or licenses) than under import 
tariffs. In the latter case a (real) devaluation will result in a higher price 
of both importables and exportables relative to nontradables. Under 
QRs, however,  while the domestic price of exportables will  still in- 
crease, that of importables will usually not be affected. All the deval- 
uation will  do is reduce the rents received  by the party that got the 
license. 
A potential problem with the replacement  of QRs by tariffs is that 
it is not easy to decide on the tariff level that should be imposed instead 
of  the QR, since under a number of  plausible  conditions (domestic 
monopoly being perhaps the most common) tariffs and quotas will not 
be equivalent. In this case there is no tariff that will exactly replicate 
both the domestic price and quantity resulting from the QR. One pos- 
sible alternative policy that has been used with some success in a few 
countries is to auction the quotas rather than allocate them in an ar- 
bitrary way.32  Among the attractive features of this option is the fact 
that it is possible to maintain certainty on the volume imported, while 
at the same time the government captures back the rent  associated 
with the quota allocation. 
To sum up, in many countries, and in particular in the poorer ones 
with  rudimentary  tax systems, taxes on trade are a  very  important 
source of government revenue. This introduces an important trade-off 
between trade liberalization reforms and the maintenance (or achieve- 
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important principle is to make sure that tariff reduction reforms should 
only be undertaken once the fiscal sector has been reformed and other 
sources of  revenue have been  found.33  Replacing  QRs by  tariffs  or 
devising  a  QRs-auctioning  system are measures that can be  imple- 
mented  without  producing fiscal  costs, while at the same time they 
improve efficiency. Also, by solving the fiscal imbalance first, the pos- 
sibility of real exchange rate overvaluation is reduced. 
4.3.3  Tariff Reform and Unemployment 
The effects of trade reform on employment are a key consideration 
when evaluating the short-run effects of these policies. This is partic- 
ularly the case under the current conditions, where countries are al- 
ready experiencing very high levels of unemployment. Moreover, from 
a political economy perspective the unemployment effects of any policy 
are crucial; democratic governments-and  even those not  so demo- 
cratic, but in a weakened position-will  try not to generate massive 
unemployment: The costs of unemployment are recognized in the short 
run, while the benefits of the structural policies that provoked it usually 
are reaped in the medium run, when a different government is in office. 
According to the simplest textbook approach, in a small developing 
economy with  capital-intensive imports, fully  mobile factors of  pro- 
duction, and flexible prices, the reduction  of import tariffs will  have 
no effect on total employment  even in  the short run. In this  simple 
setup the only  labor  market  effects of trade liberalization  will  be a 
reallocation of labor out of importables and an increase in the real wage 
rate. However, in  reality  there are a number of  reasons why  these 
textbook conditions do not hold, and why tariff reforms can result in 
a decline of employment in the short run. 
The Ricardo-Viner  model  with  downward real  wages  inflexibility 
provides the simplest model for illustrating the possible short-run un- 
employment effects of a tariff reform. In this model capital is, in the 
short run, fixed to its sector of origin; only slowly through time (and 
possibly  via  investment) can capital be  reallocated.  Contrary to the 
more traditional textbook case with full flexibility of price and resource 
movements, in this more realistic model a tariff  reduction can result 
in a reduction of the equilibrium real wage rate required to maintain 
full empl0yrnent.3~  However, if  for some reason such as government 
imposed minimum wages, indexation, or staggered contracts there is 
downward inflexibility of real wages, the required reduction in the wage 
rate will not take place, and unemployment  will result. (See Edwards 
1988a for a formal exposition on how this model works in a world with 
importables,  exportables,  and  nontradables.)  This  unemployment, 
however, will only be of  a short-run nature. As capital moves out of 
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tors, there will  be forces working for the equilibrium  real  wage  to 
increase, and those workers previously laid off will be rehired. A re- 
quirement for real wages to increase and for unemployment to disap- 
pear in the longer run is that capital is indeed reallocated. However, 
if  the reform lacks credibility as has been the case very  often with 
liberalization episodes capital will  not be reallocated  and unemploy- 
ment will persist (Edwards 1986). 
A shortcoming of the version of the Ricardo-Viner model discussed 
above is that it assumes economy-wide real wage inflexibility  and no 
initial unemployment. In fact, in most developing countries minimum 
or inflexible wages do not cover all sectors, and usually apply to the 
urban sector only.  In that regard, a more satisfactory model can be 
built  using  a three-goods  open economy version  of the well  known 
Harris-Todaro model with short-run sector-specific capital. (Through- 
out we maintain the very realistic assumption that importables are the 
most capital intensive, while nontradables are the most labor intensive 
goods.) Assume that while the importables (i.e., manufacturing) sector 
is subject to a minimum wage (in real terms), in the exportables and 
nontradables sectors there is wage flexibility. Initial equilibrium will be 
characterized by a positive amount of unemployment that will generate 
an equalization between the real wage in the exportables and nontrad- 
ables sectors and the expected real wage in the importables (manufac- 
turing) sector covered by the minimum wage. Under our assumptions 
the post-tariff reform short-run equilibrium (with capital still fixed to 
its sector of origin) will be characterized by  (1) lower employment in 
the sector covered by the minimum wage (importables);  (2)  lower wages 
in the uncovered sector, expressed in terms of exportables; (3) either 
higher or lower equilibrium unemployment; (4) either lower or higher 
employment in nontradables; (5)  higher employment and production of 
exportables. (see Edwards 1988a for a detailed analysis). 
Not surprisingly this case of partial minimum wage  coverage gen- 
erates very different results from the case of an economy-wide mini- 
mum  wage  discussed  above.  First,  we  now  have  an  increase  in 
production and employment in exportables. Second, it is possible that 
in our partial-coverage case employment in nontradables will also in- 
crease, Also, in this case a tariff reduction reform may generate smaller 
unemployment in the short run, whereas in the case of an economy- 
wide minimum wage greater unemployment always resulted in the short 
run as a consequence of a decline in the tariff (see Edwards 1988a for 
a detailed discussion). 
These models suggest that, contrary to the simplistic textbook view, 
as long as it takes time to reallocate capital from one sector to the other 
and (real) wages are inflexible, a tariff reduction reform may very well 
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eliminate the sources of real  wage  rigidity;  with  complete flexibility 
wages will,  in the short run, go down until all the labor force is ab- 
sorbed. However, if  for political or other reasons real wages cannot 
fall sufficiently, a second-best solution is to proceed slowly with the 
trade reform;  tariffs  should  be reduced  gradually in a preannounced 
fashion. In theory, in this way capital owners will have time to reallocate 
capital, avoiding the unemployment  effects of the trade reform  (see 
Edwards 1988a). Once again, for this solution to work, capital allocation 
should, in fact, respond to the announcement of reform; that is, the 
reform should be 
The NBER multicountry  study on trade regimes and employment 
directed by  Anne  Krueger (1983) has  provided  ample evidence sug- 
gesting that countries that have followed outward-oriented policies have 
generally had a better employment record, both in terms of employment 
creation and lower unemployment rates over the long run, than those 
nations that have adopted import substitution industrialization strate- 
gies. This study, however,  refers to the long-run characteristics and 
performance of the labor markets and does not say much about the 
aggregate employment  effects  during the transition  immediately fol- 
lowing a tariff reform. 
The limited existing evidence on the short-run aggregate employment 
consequences of trade liberalization indicates that in the case of mild 
reforms  there have not  been  significant aggregate unemployment  ef- 
fects. This, indeed, would seem to be one of the preliminary conclu- 
sions of the exhaustive cross-country study undertaken at the World 
Bank and directed by Papageorgiou, Michaely, and Choksi (1986). It 
is, however, somewhat difficult  to interpret the evidence from  this 
massive investigation. For example, the episodes analyzed many times 
refer to exceedingly mild liberalizations; for example, the 1970 Turkish 
devaluation, included in the study, would barely qualify as even a very 
timid liberalization. Also, from these studies, it is not possible to know 
in a precise  way  whether specific changes in aggregate employment 
respond to the trade reform, or if they are the result of other policies. 
This is the case, for example, of the slight increases in aggregate un- 
employment observed after a number of trade reforms, including the 
Turkish liberalization of 1980, the Korean reform of 1979-80,  the Phil- 
ippines’ liberalization of 1981, and the Israeli reform of 1972-77. 
Once again the Chilean experience, with its textbook-type policies 
is educational. As already  mentioned, between  1974 and  1979 Chile 
underwent one of the most, if  not the most, ambitious trade liberali- 
zation of modern times: Quantitative restrictions were fully eliminated, 
a multiple  exchange rate system consisting of up to 15 different ex- 
change  rates was  unified,  and tariffs  were slashed  to a  uniform  10 
percent. During this same period unemployment in Chile was very high, 
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reaching more than 20 percent in  1975 and never falling below 15 per- 
cent. A subject extensively debated in Chile’s popular media, as well 
as in the specialized press, is the extent to which the process of tariff 
reduction “contributed” to the unemployment problem. There is little 
doubt that as a result of the tariff reform a number of contracting, and 
even disappearing manufacturing firms laid off large numbers of work- 
ers. On the other hand, expanding firms from the exporting sectors 
increased employment, partially offsetting the negative effect. The net 
result, however, was an increase in unemployment  generated by  the 
trade reform.  This negative effect  was particularly  marked in manu- 
facturing where firms worked their way out of the difficult  situation 
created by  increased foreign competition  by  trimming their payrolls 
and increasing productivity (Edwards and Cox-Edwards 1987). 
There were two main ways in which the tariff liberalization generated 
short-run unemployment in Chile. First, there was a natural adjustment 
period where laid-off workers took time to start searching for work in 
a different, expanding sector. Second, the fact that in reality-contrary 
to the simplest textbook case-physical  capital is fixed in its sector of 
origin made the expansion of production in a number of the exporting 
sectors somewhat sluggish at first. Only as additional investment took 
place  through  time was  it  possible  to fully  increase production and 
employment in  these expanding sectors. However, the existence of 
wage rigidity and in particular of a minimum wage in real terms made 
the absorption of labor by the expanding industries more diffi~ult.~6  It 
is argued in Edwards (1985) that a slower reform would have resulted 
in a reduced unemployment effect. The proportion of total unemploy- 
ment that can be attributed to the tariff reform is, however, relatively 
small when compared to the magnitude of the overall unemployment 
problem. Edwards (1985), for example, calculated that an upper bound 
for the unemployment effects of the trade reform was 3.5 percentage 
points  of  the  labor  force, or  129,000 people, with  the bulk  of  this 
unemployment  located in the food, beverages, tobacco, textiles, and 
leather products subsectors (57,000 people). More recently, de la Cuadra 
and Hachette (1986) have calculated that the trade reform generated a 
reduction of employment in the manufacturing sector of approximately 
50,000 workers. Even though these are not negligible  numbers, they 
clearly indicate that an explanation for the bulk of the Chilean unem- 
ployment should be sought elsewhere. 
The above discussion  has  concentrated on the possible  beneficial 
effects of a gradual trade reform on employment. However, there are 
other channels, mainly  via  an intertemporal effect  on expenditure, 
through which a gradual tariff reform can have positive effects on the 
economy. For example, a slow reduction of tariffs will generally have 
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the extent that the gradual  trade liberalization process is a credible 
proposition,  it will have a nontrivial effect towards reducing the con- 
sumption rate of  interest. As the public expects tariffs, and thus the 
domestic price of importables, to be lower in the future it will postpone 
current consumption. Consequently savings will increase and the cur- 
rent account will improve. 
In  sum, a gradual lowering of tariffs offers a number of attractive 
features for economies such as  those in the debt-ridden countries. First, 
this  strategy is likely to reduce the short-run unemployment  conse- 
quences of the trade reform. Second,  there will likely be positive effects 
on savings, helping growth  prospects. Third, it will tend to improve 
the current account. And finally, a gradual reduction of tariffs will have 
positive  effects  on  the government budget. On the negative  side  a 
gradual trade reform may lack credibility,  in which case it may even 
induce perverse responses (see section 4.3.5). 
4.3.4  Structural Adjustment and Devaluation 
Nominal devaluations  are an important component of most stabili- 
zation programs, and as discussed in  section 4.2 they have played a 
central role  in  the adjustment efforts following the debt crisis. The 
purpose of these nominal devaluations is to generate a real exchange 
rate adjustment, that would  reverse the real appreciation that most 
times precedes the balance of payments crisis. In turn, by improving 
the degree of domestic competitiveness and raising the domestic price 
of tradables the real devaluations are supposed to improve the external 
sector accounts of the country in question. Historically, however, when 
implementing stepwise discrete nominal devaluations, many develop- 
ing nations have found it difficult to sustain the real devaluations for a 
long period. In a large number of cases after some time, usually ranging 
from one to two years, the real exchange  rate effect of the nominal 
discrete devaluation  has been fully eroded. In almost every instance 
this erosion can be traced back to the failure to implement consistent 
macroeconomic policies  alongside  the  devaluations  (see  Edwards, 
forthcoming). 
Devaluations have also played a key role in the trade reform com- 
ponent of structural adjustment programs.  It is generally accepted in 
policy circles that in order for a tariff reform to be successful, it has 
to be accompanied-if  not preceded-by  a real devaluation (see, how- 
ever, Edwards forthcoming  for a critical evaluation of this proposition). 
The argument usually given is based on a partial equilibrium interpre- 
tation of the elasticities approach to exchange rate determination, and 
runs along the following lines: A lower tariff will reduce the domestic 
price of importables, and consequently increase the demand for im- 
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account deficit), which  assuming that the Marshall-Lerner condition 
holds, will require a (real) devaluation to restore equilibrium. This view 
is clearly captured by the following quotation from Balassa (1982, 16): 
“[E]liminating protective measures would necessitate a devaluation in 
order to offset the resulting deficit in the balance of payments.”  It is 
along these lines, then, that the proponents of major liberalizations by 
the debt-ridden countries have insisted that these tariff reductions should 
be  accompanied by  significant nominal  devaluations (Balassa, Kue- 
zynski, and Simeonsen 1986). 
The “required” amount of devaluation will depend on a number of 
factors, including the initial conditions, the extent of the trade reform, 
the magnitude of the disequilibrium gap to be closed, and the accom- 
panying macroeconomic poli~ies.~’  In addition, and perhaps more im- 
portantly, the required  devaluation  will also depend on the speed at 
which the trade reform is implemented. Since, for a number of reasons 
including the short-run fixity of capital, short-run supply elasticities 
are much lower than long-run elasticities, under most circumstances a 
rapid trade reform will necessitate a higher real devaluation to maintain 
external eq~ilibrium.~~ 
Until quite recently most traditional structural adjustment programs 
in the developing nations have contemplated discreet nominal  deval- 
uations where the official nominal exchange rate is abruptly adjusted 
by a fairly large percentage. More recently, however, more and more 
countries are opting for the adoption of some sort of crawling peg after 
the devaluation. In a recent study on 18 devaluation episodes in Latin 
America, Edwards (1988b) found that those countries that had adopted 
a crawling peg had been significantly more successful in sustaining a 
real depreciation than the discrete devaluers. This, of course, is not in 
itself surprising,  since the crawlers maintained their real devaluation 
targets by “fighting off” the real exchange rate erosion with additional 
nominal devaluations in the following years. Typically, under this type 
of  regime,  after the  initial exchange rate adjustment the authorities 
further devalue the currency in magnitudes approximately equal to the 
domestic rate of  inflation.  Of  course, a  potential  problem  with  this 
policy is that it can lead to an explosive (nonconvergent)  process, where 
the devaluation generates inflation, which partially erodes the real ef- 
fect of the devaluation; this leads to a higher  devaluation and even 
higher  inflation  and so on, ad inJinitum. This possible unstable path 
could happen in those countries where the structural macroeconomic 
disequilibrium, and in particular the fiscal deficit, have not been cor- 
rected  to a  significant extent. An alternative scenario is  one where 
macroeconomic equilibrium is attained and the process is stabilized at 
some mild  rate of inflation,  as in  Chile in the recent period  and in 
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the Latin American crawlers in Bolivia (1982), Peru (1973, and Mexico 
(1982), the higher real exchange rate was sustained at the cost of a 
substantial permanent increase in the rate of inflation. 
In spite of  the prominent  role of devaluations in conventional ad- 
justment programs, very  little work  has investigated  empirically the 
effects of devaluations on the real  level  of economic activity  or on 
income distribution. A recently revived strand of literature has argued 
that although devaluations may have a positive effect on the external 
accounts, they will achieve this at the cost of significant reductions in 
real activity. This is the so-called contractionary devaluation hypoth- 
esis. Edwards (forthcoming), has analyzed in detail the behavior of a 
large number of key economic variables during 39 devaluation episodes 
in developing countries. In this study the evolution of some key vari- 
ables during the period going from three years prior to the devaluation 
to three years after the devaluation was analyzed and compared to the 
behavior of the same variables for a control group of 24 nondevaluing 
countries. Table 4.  I5 provides a summary of the distribution of the rate 
of growth of real GDP for the devaluing countries and the control group. 
Notice that three years prior to the devaluation this distribution is very 
similar to that of the control group. In fact, using a chi-square test for 
homogeneity we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that these data 
come from the same distribution (~~(2)  = 0.046). 
Things, however, are very different as we approach the devaluation. 
Already  during the two years prior to the devaluation we can see a 
significant difference between the devaluing and control groups, with 
the former exhibiting  substantially  lower levels  of  growth in  every 
quartile. The chi-square test strongly  rejects the null  hypothesis of 
Table 4.15  Growth of  Real GDP in Devaluing and Nondevaluing Countries 
(in percent) 
First  Third 
Quartile  Median  Quartile 
A. 39 Devaluing Countries 
3 years before  7.4  6.0  4.7 
2 years before  8.4  6.1  3.6 
1  year before  7.3  5.4  2.3 
Year of devaluation  6.1  4.2  1.2 
1  year after  6.4  4.7  3.1 
2 years after  6.4  4.7  3.  I 
3 years after  9.2  5.8  3.2 
7.4  6.4  4.5 
B. Control Group of 29 Nondevaluing  Countries 
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homogeneity for the year of the devaluation (~~(2)  = 7.02) and all three 
years following devaluation. Notice, however, that the years following 
devaluation a fairly fast recovery in the rate of growth of real GDP is 
detected. Although the information presented in this table is quite re- 
vealing, it does not allow us to know whether this behavior of real GDP 
growth is caused by  devaluation or if  it is the result of  some of  the 
policies preceding the devaluation. This problem can be partially avoided 
by using regression analysis. The following result was obtained using 
instrumental variables on a variance component model of 12 countries 
for 1965-80: 
log yrm = 0.102 [Alog M, - Alog  Mf]  + 0.210 
(1.146)  (2.331) 
[Alog M,-1 - Alog M;,] 
+ 0.1 12 log(GE/Y), - 0.083 log e,  + 0.069 log e,-  I 
(3.023)  (2.103)  (2.086) 
+ 0.044 log 7, - 0.008 log 7,-1  R2  = 0.998 
(1.431)  (- 0.265)  SEE = 0.038 
where y  is real output, [Alog M - Alog M*l is the unexpected rate of 
growth of  money, (GEIY) is the ratio of  government expenditure to 
GNP, e is the real exchange rate, and 7  is the terms of trade. According 
to these results then, in the short run devaluations have led to a slight 
fall in output: A  10 percent depreciation leads to a one-time loss of 
almost 1 percent of  GNP. In the second year, the economy returns to 
trend.  39 
Income distribution data are very scarce in the developing countries. 
This undoubtedly explains, at least partially, why there have been prac- 
tically no studies on the effects of devaluations on income distribution. 
However, there is little doubt that income and wealth distribution con- 
siderations enter heavily in  the decisions of  what kind of  policies to 
implement. In table 4.16 I present, as an illustration, some very pre- 
liminary data on devaluation and income distribution in 23 developing 
nations. This table contains the ratio of labor compensations to GDP 
for a period that goes from four years prior to a major devaluation to 
three years after the devaluations. The first column in the table provides 
information on the year of the devaluation. Although the ratio of work- 
ers’ compensations is a very rudimentary  measure of  income distri- 
bution, and this type of  “before”  and “after”  methodology has well- 
known shortcomings, the data are quite revealing. They confirm that 
in some instances devaluations have been followed by major worsen- 
ings in income distribution (i,e,,  Peru 1975). This trend, however, can- 
not be found in all cases, and not even in the majority of  episodes. In Table 4.16  Devaluations and Income Distribution (percentage of compensation to employees 
with respect to GDP) 
Devaluation 
Year of  Year 











































































































































































































































































































89  YO  90 
44  45  48 
46  44  47 
43  45  43 
48  49  50 
51  51  53 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
35  38 
47  47  50 
39  38  38 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
86  88  86 
n.a.  ma.  n.a. 
37  37  32 
86  86  86 
83  83  82 
41  39  36 
43  44  45 
Source:  United Nations,  Yeurbook of  Nutionnl Accounts  Stutistics. 
a(Cornpensation to employees + operating surplus)/GDP. 
byear  beginning July  I. 
n.a. = not available. 198  Sebastian Edwards 
fact, in a number of them the ratio of labor compensation increased 
following the devaluation. More than anything,  however,  these data 
indicate that in order to have a full understanding of the income dis- 
tribution consequences of devaluations, it is necessary to look at more 
detailed data and at alternative categories, including the effect of de- 
valuations on the ruraliurban distribution of income. 
To sum up then, the discussion in this section reveals once again the 
existence of important trade-offs associated with the different goals of 
the adjustment program. While devaluation will generally have a pos- 
itive effect on the external sector, helping generate the necessary excess 
supply for tradables, and easing the transition following a trade liber- 
alization, it will have a negative impact on the cost of foreign exchange 
to the government and on real GDP growth. In addition, devaluation 
will usually have important effects on income distribution and on in- 
flation. Since the magnitude of “required”  (real) devaluations will be 
closely  related  to the  speed at which  structural reforms  are imple- 
mented, this discussion points out, once more, the desirability of pro- 
ceeding gradually both with respect to debt payment and to structural 
reforms. 
4.3.5 Credibility, Sustainability, and Reversibility of Trade Reforms 
Credibility  is a fundamental ingredient of  successful  structural re- 
forms. If the public attaches a nontrivial probability to policy reversal, 
it will  try to anticipate this event, generally introducing strong desta- 
bilizing forces into the structural adjustment process. 
Latin America’s history is replete with frustrated economic reforms 
that have failed because of their lack of  credibility. In that respect, the 
frustrated Argentine trade reform during the Martinez de Hoz period 
is very educational. Because of lack of credibility on the future of the 
preannounced trade reform, firms used foreign funds in order to survive 
in  the  short run.  As Carlos  Rodriguez  (1983,  28)  has put  it  in  his 
evaluation of the Argentine experience of 1978-82:  “As a consequence 
of the luck of  credibility on the continuity of the economic program, 
many firms-which  would  have disappeared due to the tariff  reduc- 
tions-decided  to get  into debt in  order to remain  operating while 
waiting for a change in the economic strategy”[emphasis added]. 
A  fundamental aspect of  establishing  credibility  is  related  to the 
perception  the public  has of the internal consistency of the policies 
being pursued. In that respect, for example, the inconsistency of the 
Argentine fiscal policy, which maintained a very large deficit, and the 
preannounced exchange rate policy severely undermined the degree of 
credibility of the reform process. In the case of Chile the markedly 
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as inconsistent with the long-run viability of the liberalized economy. 
In general, if the real exchange rate experiences an unprecedented real 
appreciation, the public  will  think  that exports will  not  be able to 
develop and that there is a nontrivial probability of the reform’s being 
reversed in the future. Under these circumstances it will be optimal 
for consumers to get into debt today in  order to acquire “cheap” 
importables. 
The inability to establish consistency between fiscal and exchange 
rate policies  has many  times  been  at the heart of  the trade reform 
credibility crises in Latin America. For example, in most cases where 
(mild) trade reforms have been reversed, the public early on perceived 
that the inflation tax required to finance the fiscal dificit was inconsistent 
with maintaining a predetermined nominal exchange rate. Under these 
circumstances expectations of overvaluation, speculative attacks, ex- 
change controls, and future devaluations  developed. In trying to an- 
ticipate  these events the optimizing  private  sector will  usually  take 
steps-such  as diversifying its portfolio internationally (i.e., “capital 
flight”)-that  will sometimes  move the economy in the opposite di- 
rection from that intended by the reform. Edwards (1988~)  has found 
that more than 80 percent of reversals of trade liberalizations in Latin 
America can be traced to inconsistent fiscal policies. 
An important question is whether a gradual (i.e., slow) trade reform 
will be less or more credible than an abrupt one. Theoretical  models 
of credibility  of economic policy are only now being developed, and 
have not yet reached a level that enables us to answer this question 
with enough precision.40 In principle, it is possible to argue that grad- 
ualism  has characteristics that work in  both directions, at the same 
time  enhancing  and  compromising  credibility.  On the one hand, by 
reducing the unemployment effect, and by allowing for a firmer fiscal 
equilibrium, a gradual trade reform will tend to be more credible; on 
the other hand a slow reform will allow those groups negatively affected 
by it (i.e.,  the import substitution  manufacturing  sector) to organize 
and lobby against the policies. At the end, as is so often the case in 
economics, whether gradualism will enhance credibility will depend on 
factors specific to each country. What is clear, however, is that poli- 
cymakers should always pay special attention on the establishment of 
credibility when persuing important long-term structural changes. 
Although at this  point,  given our knowledge  of  the policymaking 
process and its interaction with the private sector, it is not possible to 
derive a precise  theorem, the arguments presented in this  section- 
including unemployment, fiscal, and other considerations-suggest  that, 
in general, it would  be more prudent to implement the trade reform 
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4.4  Concluding Remarks and Summary 
The adjustment packages  of  1982-87  sought “effectiveness.”  On 
some grounds, and especially in terms of the turnarounds of the current 
accounts, the results have been quite impressive. The costs, however, 
have been high. Not only did real income decline, as illustrated in table 
4.2, but  real  wages  declined  in  most countries, and  unemployment 
soared. There is little doubt that this is not a sustainable adjustment 
path. A  successful adjustment means that debtor countries will have 
to bring down their debt-to-GDP ratios to a level consistent with the 
reestablishment  of creditworthiness, while recovering their growth of 
output and consumption. The first objective  means that the country 
has to transfer a given discounted value of resources to the rest of the 
world. The second means that the country has to increase its rate of 
capital formation and the efficiency of resource use. The problem faced 
by the highly indebted nations can be posed as  follows: how to minimize 
the present value of the foregone consumption from making a transfer 
of a specific discounted value. The problem then has two dimensions: 
how  to minimize  the cost of  the transfer at each moment  of  time, 
including its distributive aspect, and what should be the flow of trans- 
fers over time consistent with a given present value of the flow. 
The speed with which the transfer to the rest of the world is made 
will affect  the (discounted  value of the) cost of achieving creditwor- 
thiness. A very fast increase in the trade surplus can only be obtained 
at a very high cost in terms of nontraded goods and losses in employ- 
ment, both because it  takes time for factors to be retrained and  to 
move, and because of wage inflexibility in the short run. It also takes 
time  to implement  efficient fiscal  instruments to generate the  fiscal 
surplus, particularly if  one wants to eliminate the present reliance of 
taxes on trade and the inflationary finance of the deficit. Finally, im- 
proving the allocation of investment and promoting the return of capital 
flight may involve liberalizing financial markets, which  will  increase 
the fiscal cost of servicing internal debt. Thus, improved efficiency and 
capital accumulation will require important increases in nondistortive 
taxes and cuts in public expenditures: but this takes time. In sum, there 
are important trade-offs between effecting the transfer rapidly and min- 
imizing its cost at one moment of time. Instruments that help generate 
the trade surplus quickly-like  quantitative restrictions-increase  the 
resource cost of achieving the transfer. Instruments that solve the fiscal 
problem quickly-like  using tariffs or QRs instead of a devaluation- 
also increase that cost. 
A slower speed of adjustment can only be achieved if the magnitude 
of  the transfer countries have  to make is  reduced during the initial 
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additional lending during the transition. In principle this will allow the 
implementation  of slower expenditure-switching  policies and the im- 
plementation  of  more efficient  fiscal  instruments to raise  public  re- 
sources. Most importantly, it will allow the investment rates to be kept 
up without unduly  sacrificing consumption. Thus there is a comple- 
mentarity between extra lending during the transition and the recovery 
of growth while transferring abroad a given present value of resources. 
A longer-run solution of the debt crisis will clearly require the adop- 
tion of policies that rely more heavily than in the past on export growth. 
Even ECLALEPAL, the former champion of import substitution de- 
velopment, has recommended outward-oriented policies. Export pro- 
motion requires some kind of trade liberalization and tariff reduction, 
especially of imported inputs and capital goods. Indeed, the historical 
evidence clearly shows that those countries that have successfully pur- 
sued export promotion (Lee,  the East Asian nations), have had a trade 
regime  substantially more liberal than those countries that have fol- 
lowed indiscriminate  import substitution  based on protectionism. A 
crucial question, however, is how much trade liberalization is needed. 
It is argued in the chapter that although outward orientation requires 
some trade liberalization,  there are no reasons, either theoretical or 
empirical, that suggest that the “optimal” degree of liberalization im- 
plies zero, or even very low, tariffs coupled  with no government in- 
tervention in any sphere of the development process. The successful 
experiences with export-led growth in the East Asian countries support 
this view; although in these countries the trade regime has been sig- 
nificantly liberal, government intervention has been important and tar- 
iffs have never been anything close to zero or a very low (i.e., 10-15 
percent) uniform level. 
An important policy question is whether the trade liberalization com- 
ponent of an outward-oriented strategy should be attempted at the same 
time that a country is embarked on a severe stabilization program. It 
is  argued  in  the chapter that, in  general, it is  not  recommended to 
undertake substantial trade reforms at the same time that a major anti- 
inflationary program is underway. This is both for fiscal and real ex- 
change rate reasons. However, there are some measures, such as the 
replacement  of quotas for tariffs, that can help both the anti-inflation 
drive as well as the quest for improvement of  efficiency. 
Under the most plausible circumstances a fast trade liberalization 
will generate short-run unemployment effects. Indeed, the empirical 
evidence from the Southern Cone tends to confirm this presumption. 
This  suggests that trade liberalization  should  be  a gradual  and pre- 
announced process. This, however, brings up serious credibility issues. 
Only if the announced gradual trade reform is “credible” will economic 
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presented in section 4.3  clearly suggests that under many circumstances 
abrupt devaluations can generate nontrivial short-run costs in the form 
of output reductions and unemployment. It is argued that gradual lib- 
eralizations  will  require  smaller devaluations, possibly  reducing the 
associated costs. 
A sustained increase in the indebted countries’ exports-which  is, 
of course, a prerequisite for a long-term solution to the crisis-will  not 
only require an efficient tradables sector and a “realistic” real exchange 
rate but, more important, that the current protectionist  trend  in the 
industrial countries and in particular in the United States be reversed. 
Data presented by Edwards (1 987a) indicate that at this time the extent 
of nontariff barriers, as a form of protection in the industrial countries, 
is very significant. Moreover, the data show that these trade impedi- 
ments are particularly important for goods originating in the developing 
nations, and that their tariff  equivalents  are in  many cases very  sig- 
nificant. Asking the highly indebted developing countries to pay their 
debts while  impeding their  exports from  reaching  the industrialized 
markets is not only unfair, but also politically unwise. 
Notes 
1. It should be noticed, however, that most experts now agree that in some 
of the poorer countries it would be highly implausible to reduce the debt-export 
ratio to the levels required  for access to new voluntary  financing.  In these 
cases some innovative and less orthodox solutions, including debt forgiveness, 
may be the most efficient way out. 
2. See, for example, Balassa et. al. (1986) and Krueger (1987). 
3. The IMF’s 15 highly  indebted countries are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Ivory Coast, Ecuador, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Phil- 
ippines, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. 
4. On the Brazilian experience see Cardoso and Fishlow (1987); on Mexico 
see Buffie and Sangines (1987); Celgsun and Rodrik (1987) deal with Turkey. 
These papers are published in the country studies volumes of this project. On 
Chile see Edwards and Cox-Edwards (1987). 
5. See Dornbusch (chap. 8 in this volume) for discussion of the role of the 
developed countries’ macropolicies on the development of the crisis. 
6. See Bianchi, Devlin, and Ramos (1987). 
7. Notice, however,  that it is not completely rigorous to talk about overvalued 
real exchange rates without first analyzing the way in which the equilibrium 
real exchange rate has evolved (see Edwards, forthcoming). In the case of the 
debtor countries, however, the existing evidence clearly suggests that signifi- 
cant overvaluations developed. 
8. On the Chilean experience see Edwards (1985) and Edwards and Cox- 
Edwards (1987). 
9. On Argentina see Calvo (1986a) and Corbo, de Melo, and Tybout (1986). 
10. On Colombia see Thomas (1986). See Collins and Park (1987) on Korea 
and Woo and Nasution (1987) on Indonesia. 203  Structural Adjustment Policies in Highly Indebted Countries 
1  I.  The exact time periods are Argentina, 1982-85;  Ecuador, 1982-83;  Mex- 
12. Computed from raw data published in IMF, Government Finance  Sta- 
13. See Edwards and Cox-Edwards (1987). 
14. Although real devaluations will increase the servicing of public debts in 
real domestic currency, they can have some other positive effects on the public 
sector’s budget. This will be the case in those countries where the main ex- 
porting firms are government owned. 
15. On the Argentine exchange rate guarantees scheme, see Calvo (1986a); 
on Chile see Edwards (1985). 
16. For a detailed analysis on the nonequivalence between quotas and tariffs 
see Bhagwati (1978).  See also Hillman, Tower, and Fishelson (1980). 
17. Note, however, that in spite of Khan and Knight’s description in the past 
not every Fund sponsored program included exchange rate actions. It is in fact 
important to recognize  that historically  the IMF has exhibited  significantly 
more flexibility than its critics have given it credit for. There has been, to some 
extent, a case-by-case approach. From the record it seems, however, that the 
Fund staff considers that the vast majority of the cases are quite similar. 
18. Balassa et al. (1986) and Krueger (1987) are good representatives of this 
view. See also Fischer (1986). 
19. The other policies advocated by Balassa et al. (1986) include financial 
reform, stable  real exchange rates, and a much reduced role for  the government. 
20.  On the evidence on  the performance of  outward- vs. inward-oriented 
strategies see, for example, the World Book, World Development Report 1987 
and the literature cited therein. On CEPAL see, for example, Bianchi, Devlin, 
and Ramos (1987). 
21. See Krueger (1978) and Bhagwati (1978). On earlier discussions on lib- 
eralization see Little, Scitovsky, and Scott (1971). For a recent treatment of 
many of these issues see the volume edited by Choksi and Papageorgiou (1986). 
22. This was indeed the meaning given by  some to the concept during the 
Southern Cone experiences with market-oriented policies in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. In a recent paper Bhagwati (1986) has made an effort to define in 
a precise way export promotion, import substitution,  and ultra trade-promoting 
trade policies. In the rest of this paper we will stick to trade and commercial 
policies when referring to trade liberalization. 
23. See, for example, Bhagwati’s (1986) splendid paper on outward orien- 
tation. To  date the most impressive accumulation of empirical evidence sup- 
porting the better performance of outward orientation has been compiled in 
the 1987 World Development Report. See also Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1978). 
ico, 1983-84;  Uruguay, 1982-84;  and Venezuela, 1982-83. 
tistics  Yearbook, 1986. 
24. See, for example, World Bank (1986). 
25. On Colombia see Thomas (1986). 
26. Naturally, the welfare effects of trade liberalizations fall within the realm 
of second-best economics. Rigorously speaking if there are other distortions, 
as invariably there are in the real world, it is not possible to know a priori if 
a partial trade liberalization  will  be welfare improving. If there are no other 
distortions, it is possible to establish a positive relation between the level of 
tariffs and the level of income. Still however, no traditional growth model will 
link no tariffs to higher growth (see Lucas 1985). 
27. Notice, however, that even the Koreans made mistakes when they pushed 
the government role too far. In that respect, the fiasco of  1974-79  when the 
government picked  the wrong  “winners”  is  well  known.  See World  Bank 
( 1986). 204  Sebastian Edwards 
28. See, for example, Krueger (1981) and Little (1982). 
29. See, for example, Edwards (1988b) for a detailed analysis of  18 stabili- 
zation with mild liberalization episodes in Latin America. 
30. Naturally, although very common, this is not the only scenario leading 
to a stabilization with structural adjustment program. In an alternative scenario 
that fits some country's experiences during the period leading to the debt crisis, 
the fiscal expansion is financed with foreign borrowing instead of money cre- 
ation. In this case the path  leading to the need  to adjust in not  necessarily 
characterized by a piling up of trade and exchange controls. 
31. The recent Bolivian experience is also characterized by a tremendous 
trade liberalization. However, the fact that this was part of a package to defeat 
hyperinflation sets the Bolivian case apart. 
32. While a number of countries have successfully used foreign exchange 
auctions-Jamaica,  Sierra Leone, Uganda-only  a few have implemented gen- 
eralized auctions for imports of goods. See Krumm (1985) for a discussion on 
different experiences with exchange auctions. 
33. Notice, however, that from a welfare perspective this is by no means a 
trivial proposition.  Indeed, from a purely theoretical  point  of  view it is not 
clear that reducing tariffs and increasing other taxes will be welfare improving. 
Moreover,  at least  at the theoretical  level,  it  is  not  clear that welfare  will 
increase if, as liberalization advocates have sometimes proposed, consumption 
taxes are raised as tariffs are reduced. This, of course, is a simple application 
of the second-best theorem. 
34. Whether this reduction  in the equilibrium real wage will  actually take 
place will depend on the weight of exportables in the price level relevant for 
determining real wages.  If, as in a large number of developing countries, ex- 
portables (i.e., foodstuffs) have a large weight in the consumer price index the 
equilibrium real wage will indeed decline (see Edwards 1988a). 
35.  On theoretical models of the labor market effects of trade reforms see 
Edwards (1986; 1988a) and the references cited therein. 
36.  See chapter 6 of Edwards and Cox-Edwards (1987) for a detailed dis- 
cussion of the evolution of wages in Chile. 
37. We  are referring to the extent of real devaluation. However, since the 
real exchange rate is not a policy tool, economic authorities  face the additional 
difficulty of deciding by how much to adjust the nominal exchange rate in order 
to generate a given real devaluation. 
38. This statement assumes that a tariff reduction will result in an equilibrium 
real  exchange rate depreciation.  Although  this  is  the more plausible  case, 
theoretically it is not the only possible result (see Edwards 1987b). 
39. The countries included in this regression are: Brazil, Colombia, El  Sal- 
vador, Greece, India, Israel, Malaysia, Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand,  and Yugoslavia. The equation was estimated using a fixed  effect 
instrumental variables procedure, where country-specific dummy variables were 
included. The following instruments were used: all  the exogenous variables, 
twice-lagged money surprises, twice-lagged terms of trade, twice-lagged real 
exchange rates, contemporary, lagged and twice-lagged  growth of domestic 
credit (for details, see Edwards 1986). 
40. Guillermo Calvo, however,  has recently made important contributions 
to this key area of the theory of economic policy (see Calvo 1986b; 1987). 205  Structural Adjustment Policies in Highly Indebted Countries 
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